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Abstract 
The rise of China poses many challenges and opportunities for China   as 
well as for other countries. Will its rapid rise in power change the way in 
which world affairs are run? If so, in what way will global governance be 
affected? What are China's aspirations, demands and limitations in its en-
gagement with global governance?  This paper addresses these questions. 
First, it takes a look at China's view of the nature of global governance. Then 
it identiﬁes the principles and tactics used by the Chinese government in 
dealing with global governance before making an assessment of the special 
features of Chinese international relations in this area. Next the paper turns 
to the perceptions of other major countries towards China's behaviour in 
the area. It concludes by suggesting that China's increasing involvement in 
global governance is accompanied by a like impact of its policy preferences. 
Keywords: global governance, multilateralism, realism, United Nations, United States.
China and Global Governance
The rise of China poses many challenges and opportunities for China 
as well as for other countries. One of the challenges, so far as interna-
tional relations are concerned, is whether or not China will pose a threat 
to the existing world order. That is to say, whether or not China will 
change the way in which global affairs are being governed. At present, 
the governance of the existing system is dominated by such powerful 
states as the United States and those in Western Europe, in the sense 
that the extant international rules, which regulate the behaviour of 
states towards one another, are mostly made, interpreted, and enforced 
by these powerful states. Acting alone or in concert, they endeavour to 
protect and promote their national interests, very often in competition 
with other states but sometimes with each other. Apart from competi-
tion, they also sometimes cooperate among themselves or with others 
to tackle global problems.
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In ideological terms and in many other ways China is not part of the 
West. It is by and large a big developing country, although very dif-
ferent from most of the other countries in the Third World. It is huge 
in demographic size and in many aggregate measures, but remains 
relatively small in per capita terms.1 It is, however, a nuclear power 
with a veto in the United Nations Security Council. Will its rapid tran-
sition in development and its quick rise in various measures of power 
change the way in which the world is run? If so, in what way will global 
governance be affected? What are China's aspirations, demands, and 
limitations in its increasing engagement with global governance?  This 
paper addresses these questions.
In political science governance refers to the regulation and manage-
ment activities that aim at steering society to achieve some collective 
goals (Pierre and Peters 2000: 1).2 Drawing on the work of Robert Cox, 
the formation of global governance or governance without a world 
government can be seen as a transnational process of consensus for-
mation among the major stakeholders of the global community that 
regulates and manages global issues effectively. Taking place through 
formal international organisations or informal forums, this multilat-
eral, interactive process of consensus building generates consensual 
guidelines, rules and norms that are subsequently transmitted into the 
policy-making processes of states and non-state actors (Cox 1996: 296-
313). In other words, global governance is premised on the taking of 
collective and consensual actions by an array of actors, especially the 
more powerful ones, with the aim of regulating and tackling problems 
of global concerns in various issue-areas.
Here global governance refers simply to the various ways in 
which world affairs are being managed. The actors which exercise 
governance are many, including states and non-state actors such as 
interest groups, international organisations, and even individuals, 
although it is often acknowledged that powerful states, especially 
those in the West, are instrumental in shaping the way in which 
world affairs are run.3 These actors exercise their inﬂuence at many 
different levels, ranging from the individual and group levels to the 
state and global levels. The issues involved are numerous, including 
such important ones as trade, arms control, environmental protection, 
human rights, and so on.4 Seen in this light, global governance is an 
extremely complex matter. This is so in view of the accelerating pace 
of globalisation, which increases the speed, depth, and intensity of 
international connections.
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The process of globalisation, and hence global governance itself, 
is not something entirely new, but the momentum of change has in-
creased signiﬁcantly in contemporary times as a result of the ease of 
communications of various kinds, be they political, economic, social, 
or technological. In the case of China, the adoption of the reform and 
opening-up policy since 1978 has helped to speed up the process and 
complicate the substance of global governance. Many top Chinese lead-
ers in the current fourth generation of leadership, including President 
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabo, have made numerous overseas trips 
around the world in recent years. Chinese businesspeople, sometimes 
travelling with their political leaders and diplomats, have been search-
ing around the world for commercial opportunities and for oil and raw 
materials to fuel China's industrialisation. As a result of its breakneck 
industrialisation, it has been reported that China surpassed the United 
States in 2006 as the top emitter of carbon dioxide, a major component 
of greenhouse gases.5  Its industrial production led to its rapid rise in 
exports and investments. Initially its investment activities started in-
wards with the country becoming the largest recipient of FDI in 2002, 
but recently the country has turned outwards, focusing its investments 
on telecommunications, extracting industries, and other forms of capital 
expansion.6 Since the late 1970s, China has increased its participation 
in international organisations,7 both intergovernmental as well as non-
governmental ones.8 In line with such participation is the signature and 
ratiﬁcation of major international treaties.9 All these involvements in 
world affairs are reﬂected in elite discourses of the country's engagement 
with global governance. A survey of a Chinese dataset called 'China 
Journal Net: Economics, Politics, and Law' reveals that the number of 
articles citing quanqiu zhili (global governance) was nil before 1994 and 
ranged from one to three before 1999, but rose sharply from over ten in 
2000 to over sixty in 2006 (see Figure).10 
To examine this interesting yet puzzling phenomenon of China's 
engagement with global governance, this paper proposes to examine 
China's view of the nature of global governance, and then to identify 
the principles and tactics used by the Chinese government in dealing 
with global governance before making an assessment of the features 
in this area of Chinese international relations. The paper turns next to 
the perceptions of other major countries towards China's behaviour in 
this area. The conclusion draws together the ﬁndings to make some 
observations.
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China's View of the Nature of Global Governance
China sees the existing structure of the international system and the 
nature of its governance as unequal, undemocratic, and therefore un-
just. It is unequal because the distribution of global wealth is highly 
uneven, with the world's rich getting richer and its poor poorer. It is 
undemocratic because the world's imperialist hegemonies continue to 
ride roughshod over the weak, imposing their will and values on oth-
ers without paying due attention to their plight and local conditions. 
Most decisions affecting major international relations are not made in 
accordance with the democratic principle of 'one state, one vote,' like 
the situation in the United Nations General Assembly. Rather they are 
made by the world's rich and powerful nations, particularly those in 
the West, and then imposed on the world as a whole. Because of this 
inequality and undemocratic way, the current state of global governance 
is therefore unjust. The message embedded in this line of thinking is 
that this system of governance, dominated by the West in general, and 
the U.S. in particular, needs to be changed. During the Maoist days, this 
intended change was to be brought about by revolutions. Now that the 
world situation is seen to be very different from that of the past in the 
Chinese eyes, change should instead be brought about by diplomatic 
means, typiﬁed by the use of carefully crafted principles and tactics. 
FIGURE 1  Citations of Global Governance in Journal Articles in   
 China, 1979-2006
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The Principles of China's Global Governance
The ﬁrst principle of China's engagement with global governance is the 
pursuit of national interest. Here China is no different from most, if not 
all, other countries, irrespective of the different political systems that 
they choose to adopt. Neither is the second principle of the preservation 
of sovereignty different in any great measure from those of other coun-
tries. The differences in emphasis, if any, lie in the different capabilities, 
potential or perceived, that different countries command to protect and 
preserve their own sovereignty. A militarily and economically strong 
country like the United States does not have to worry too much about 
possible foreign infringements of its sovereignty because of its massive 
capabilities to retaliate.11 In comparison, China has to worry more about 
protecting its sovereignty. Firstly, there is the issue of Taiwan; a territory 
which has not yet been reunited with China despite the latter's effort to 
cut off Taiwan's international links and diplomatic relations with other 
countries and despite China's offer of commercial and political conces-
sions of one kind or another to Taiwan. Strategically Taiwan can easily 
be exploited by other countries, for example the U.S., to pose a security 
threat to China. Apart from Taiwan, there is the problem of Tibet and 
other secessionist forces in Xinjiang province. The riots and demonstra-
tions in Lhasa and other nearby places in March 2008 only serve to rein-
force in the minds of China's leaders, that the Tibetan issue is a separatist 
issue of national sovereignty rather than an issue of human rights or 
ethnic difference. Secondly, China is still a relatively poor developing 
country. Although some of its coastal regions enjoy phenomenal eco-
nomic growth and wealth, large parts of China still struggle to combat 
poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental problems. Thirdly, it 
has a recent history of being bullied by Western powers in the so-called 
one hundred years of national humiliation. It is still a fragile state in 
many respects (Shirk 2007). Fourthly, China shares its land borders with 
ﬁfteen countries, and fourteen rivers with its neighbours. What China 
does or does not do to deal with territorial disputes and environmental 
pollution can easily affect neighbouring countries thereby cause poten-
tial conﬂicts. Thus China has to stand ﬁrm when dealing with issues of 
sovereignty and national interest. However, China also realises that it 
can hardly confront the United States head-on in military, political, or 
economic affairs. It has to play smart in handling its relations with the 
world's sole superpower so that China can properly protect and promote 
its national interests. To work cordially with the United States is seen to 
_________________________________________________________________________87
_______________________________ Global Governance with Chinese Characteristics? 
be the best option for China, although in doing so it has to endure oc-
casional setbacks and short changes such as the loss of its Third World 
credentials. Meanwhile, it works unceasingly to build up a multilateral 
structure or a multipolar system in the world so as to check and balance 
the unilateral actions taken by the United States.12
China's Strategies and Tactics in Global Governance
Guided by the above principles, the Chinese government engages in 
global governance within the context of its overall foreign policy ob-
jectives. Discarding Mao Zedong's revolutionary zeal, Chinese foreign 
policy since the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping came to power has be-
come more pragmatic both in the goals to be achieved and the methods 
with which to achieve them. The 'three worlds' theory has given way 
to an independent foreign policy and then to peace and development, 
evolving into something that is multi-level, multi-faceted and omni- di-
rectional, aimed at winning friends from all over the world. This policy 
path anchors on the United Nations system as its bedrock, on which 
China builds its multilateral diplomacy. China believes that multilat-
eral diplomacy enhances its block support from the Third World in its 
bargaining and negotiations with the West. A good example is China's 
siding with the developing world led by India and Brazil in the WTO 
Doha Round in negotiating the issue of agricultural subsidies handed 
out by governments in the rich developed countries to their own farmers 
(The Financial Times 2006). China sided too with the developing world in 
the Bali conference in December 2007 to discuss ways to tackle climate 
change when the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 (BBC News 2006).
Another evidence of China's pragmatic approach is its adoption of a 
win-win strategy, which aims to achieve mutual beneﬁts rather than a 
one-sided gain based on self interest or ideological preference. This win-
win strategic may run into difﬁculties with the West in some instances. 
China's involvement in Darfur, western Sudan, is a case in point. Gov-
ernments in the West have heavily criticised China for turning a blind 
eye to human-rights abuses there in its pursuit of commercial interests 
and its search for oil.13 In response China says that it has no business to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,14 a policy that stands in 
contrast to the idea of the 'responsibility to protect'15 promoted by some 
countries in the West. This idea argues that the international community 
should intervene to provide the necessary protection to local residents if 
governments fail to do so or if these governments commit genocide, war 
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crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. African countries 
receiving Chinese aid or enjoying substantial trade with China are of two 
minds: some welcome China's involvement, which provides an alterna-
tive source of help and an alternative model of development in view 
of Western failures to reduce Third World poverty in the past decades; 
others may feel that China is no different from other colonial masters 
in the past who tried to exploit their resources (Thompson 2007). As a 
way to lessen the concerns of the West over China's aid policy towards 
Africa, the country has agreed to join forces with the World Bank to co-
ordinate aid to African countries so as to help them achieve sustainable 
development in an open and transparent way (Wheatley 2007).
In the pursuit of a pragmatic strategy in international affairs, China 
exhibits behaviour in two notable areas. One is the joining of interna-
tional organisations and the entering into international treaties, thereby 
bringing China's standard of behaviour closer to international standards 
through complying with global norms and rules. The record of China's 
global compliance is, however, a mixed bag, given the fact that China 
is still relatively new to the international system, a system which has 
been dominated by the West since its modern inception. Also, in many 
areas, China lacks the capacity if not the will to comply. For example, 
China lacks a robust legal system and there is a mismatch between the 
central and local governments in policy implementation. Nevertheless, 
China is now a full member of the international community, by member-
ship count if not by active participation in the full range of activities of 
international organisations. For the foreseeable a gap is likely to remain 
between China's actual practice and the standard of behaviour expected 
of it by the West although this gap has been narrowing over time since 
the 1980s despite occasional setbacks.16
Another kind of behaviour that China exhibits in the pursuit of a 
pragmatic strategy is the exercise of soft power. This is done deliber-
ately as well as by coincidence as China tries to develop and modernise, 
hopefully within a stable international environment and a congenial do-
mestic situation. China does not seem to have a grand design to pursue 
big-power politics by ﬂexing its military muscles in the pursuit of its 
national interests. Rather it tries to promote trade and investments and to 
make its presence felt through tourism, social, cultural, and educational 
exchanges. The establishment of some 200 Confucius Institutes around 
the world to promote Chinese language and culture has been cited by 
many observers as an example of China's exercise of soft power. It is 
difﬁcult to assess the extent to which China is successful in projecting its 
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soft power. Different scholars seem to make different assessments, but 
most would agree that China's spread of its soft power is underpinned 
by its increasing economic and military might. In terms of its political 
system and institutions, the country offers little to emulate.17 Its overall 
politico-economic development, however, does provide some hope and 
possibly some useful guides for many Third World countries to consider 
in their political transition and economic development.
Characteristics of China's Global Governance
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the main characteristic of 
China's global governance is its realpolitik position in dealing with world 
affairs. This realpolitik approach is buttressed by realism based on the 
enhancement of national interest and the protection of sovereignty, a 
kind of classical embodiment of realist politics, coupled with pragmatism 
in handling current problems that the country faces and in fulﬁlling its 
aspirations.18 If China's realism is little  different to other types of real-
ism pursued by other countries, then perhaps China's sense of realism 
is more urgently felt and is more solidly embedded in its traditions 
and in its modern encounter with imperialism. It is shaped by its rather 
unique experience of being a large country with a long history that 
had been largely closed to the outside world for some 600 years before 
the mid-nineteenth century. China's realism is heavily led by the state, 
more so perhaps than in many other countries, but it shows increasing 
adaptability and ﬂexibility in contemporary times.
Despite China's increasing involvement in world affairs and global 
governance, its international proﬁle is still largely a low-key one. This 
Chinese style can partly be explained by its long tradition of being a 
conservative and inward-looking civilisation, and partly by its lack 
of international experience, given the fact that it was very reluctantly 
dragged into the world system, a system it had been trying  unsuccess-
fully to shun  since the mid-nineteenth century. Although a small group 
of intellectuals may have been willing to learn from the outside, the 
country's tradition and conservatism have acted as a brake from time 
to time in the long process of global social learning. In the transition 
from tradition to modernity, China has shown traits of both old and 
new, rigidity and ﬂexibility, die-hard habits and modern adaptations. 
This situation begs the question as to whether China is really interna-
tionalising and being socialised into international norms or whether it 
is trying to adjust tactically in order to advance its interests under dif-
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ﬁcult circumstances which it wants to avoid as far as possible.19 China's 
socialisation experience with the practice outside is less than clear-cut; 
much depends on circumstances, the issues involved, and timing. It 
is fair to say that there is a lot of ﬂuidity, a kind of a mix or an uneasy 
harmony of yins and yangs.20 In a certain sense, China tries to harmonise 
itself with outside demands, whether they come from other states or 
international organisations or out of its own realisation of the need to 
do so. Certainly, China is changing to look more like a 'normal' state, 
more akin to the standard practices in the outside world, in a competi-
tive game of global politics. An important question that follows on from 
this development is how other countries perceive China's changing 
engagement with global governance.
How Do Others View China's Global Governance?
Four views are brieﬂy considered here: that of the European Union, the 
United States, Asian countries, and the developing world. It is difﬁcult to 
assess the views of a group as large and as diverse as the twenty-seven 
member states of the EU, given the fact that some of them may have 
different ideas as to how to deal with China's human-rights behaviour, 
the issue of trade protectionism, the issue of strategic and military ties, 
and others. It is fair to say that on the whole the EU is more accom-
modating to China than the United States.21 Although major countries 
such as France and Germany, not to mention the U.K., have more in 
common with the U.S. than with China in terms of culture, tradition, and 
strategic outlook, they also want to have a stable international environ-
ment sustained by a balance of power, through their own experiences 
in the European theatre. This particular line of thinking ties in well with 
China's: to see to it that U.S. unilateralism can be checked in order to 
attain global stability underpinned by different power centres each bal-
ancing the other in alliances and partnerships, formal or informal. The 
rise of China in trade and ﬁnance adds a new factor for EU countries to 
consider when they develop their relations with China, as China offers 
both challenges and opportunities that EU countries can ill afford to 
ignore. The EU can play a balancing act between China and the U.S. The 
exact conﬁguration of this balance depends on the particular issues and 
actors involved, the kind of the bilateral relationships in question, and 
the personal chemistry between leaders, among other factors.
Sino-U.S. ties have been marked by a love-hate relationship for a 
long time, and the present U.S. policy towards China consists of a mix 
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of containment and engagement, or 'congagement', as a Rand Corpo-
ration analyst in California has put it.22 While some hawkish elements 
in the country favour a policy of containment, trying to limit China's 
inﬂuence, there are elements within the U.S. political establishment 
which call for an active engagement with China, since a rising China is 
largely benign and inevitable. These two policy lines – containment and 
engagement – can hardly be separated from each other. They exist with 
each other most of the time, even if ofﬁcial statements in the U.S. stress 
the importance of one over the other at different times and under differ-
ent sets of circumstances. Despite their differences over human-rights 
issues, the status of Taiwan, trade, environmental protection, nuclear 
non-proliferation, and other areas, bilateral contacts at various levels 
have increased recently. The latest contacts include the establishment 
in 2006 of the Strategic Economic Dialogue which brings together trade 
ministers to exchange views and to discuss issues of mutual concerns 
beyond the purview of trade and economics. 
The presence of American military, economic and political inﬂuence 
in Asia plays an important part in shaping the perceptions of China 
harboured by Asian countries. Most of these countries are dwarfed by 
China's size, and traditionally they have come under the inﬂuence of the 
Chinese Empire. They fear the dominance of China and yet they have to 
ﬁnd a way to live and work with this giant neighbour. The presence of 
the U.S. in the region helps to ease somewhat Asian fears of China. Asian 
countries jump readily onto the American bandwagon in dealing with 
China. Their fear of a militarily strong China is only mitigated by the 
U.S. presence in Asia and America's bilateral and multilateral military 
relations with many of them. The initial fear of China as an economic 
power which could take away the markets of many Asian countries and 
divert investment ﬂows away from them have proved to be exaggerated. 
In reality China has become the engine of growth for Asia, providing a 
ready market for Asian products and a low-cost manufacturing centre 
for some Asian countries. China's attraction of FDI has not been at the 
expense of other Asian countries, as previously thought to be the case. 
As a result, many Asian countries now look towards China as a major 
opportunity. Whether or not they fear a militarily strong China has 
largely been left unsaid among Southeast Asian politicians. Also there 
are unresolved disputes between China and its neighbours such as the 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In a 
survey of 'how the world sees China' released by Pew Research Center 
in late 2007, apart from Japan and India, nearly all Asian countries hold 
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a favourable view of China's rise in the world (see pewresearch.org 
site 2007). This cannot be said, however, of the public opinions of the 
West towards China, whose popularity rating has been plummeting 
because of China's poor human-rights record, the low safety standard 
of Chinese products, and the taking away of jobs in the industrialised 
West by China.
Although China is not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, nor 
is it an active member of the Group of 88, China claims to be a develop-
ing country belonging to the Third World. In ofﬁcial pronouncements 
and in actual behaviour, China does seem to curry favour with Third 
World countries, giving an increasing amount of trade concessions and 
assistance of various kinds to an increasing number of them. The fact 
that China has managed to generate phenomenal economic growth has 
presented an attractive model for other developing countries to adopt. 
The lure of China's soft power in the developing world, especially in 
Africa, has caused considerable alarm in the West.23 The successful 
holding of the China-African summit in Beijing in November 2006 led 
to the catching up of the EU-African summit in Lisbon in December 
2007. The lukewarm and uneven reception of the economic partner-
ship agreements proposed by the EU serves to show Africa's increased 
leverage because of its newly established China connection (BBC News 
2007). Whether China has provided a model of development – strong 
economic growth coupled with strong authoritarian rule – for other 
Third World countries to follow is too early to say. At least China has 
provided an alternative way to modernisation and an alternative source 
of foreign aid with little or no conditions attached.24
Conclusion
One of the most intriguing questions surrounding China's current 
involvement in global governance is whether the country is a peace-
ful power in the international community or a rising challenger to the 
existing order. From the foregoing analysis, it is quite clear that China's 
rise embodies elements of both, but perhaps with a difference in promi-
nence. There is no doubt in the minds of most observers that China is 
rising in aggregate powers, although some may dispute whether this 
is a rise or a revival. In any case, China wants to stand tall in the sense 
of trying to get rich and powerful quickly, a revival of its former glory 
long before the arrival of imperialism on its shore. To do this, China 
wants to have a stable and peaceful environment so that it can develop 
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smoothly. However, doubt has been expressed as to whether, if and 
when China has eventually become rich and powerful, it will behave 
like other rising powers before it, that is, will China become a hegemony 
with imperialist behaviour? No one quite knows the answer; different 
people, looking at the same situation from different angles, may have 
come to different conclusions.
In ofﬁcial statements, the U.S. would like to see China as a responsible 
stakeholder in world affairs.25 By acknowledging that China as a stake-
holder, the U.S. recognises the status and certain rights of China in the 
international system. This American recognition seems to have pleased 
the Chinese, as the Chinese government has fought to be properly rec-
ognised and respected for much of the past century and a half.26 
 The U.S. wants to see China as a responsible member of the interna-
tional community, in which China will comply with the existing rules 
and norms that are designed and maintained by the West, and the U.S. in 
particular. China, on the other hand, would like to be seen as a responsi-
ble member, partly out of its desire to maintain a good public image and 
partly because it does not want to antagonise the West unnecessarily. 
However, it realises that the existing system is not always working in its 
favour, or that the same system does not distribute a fair share of costs 
and beneﬁts to the developing world. Therefore China aspires to work, 
wherever possible within limits, to change the existing rules so that they 
can set a fairer way of treating China and other developing countries. 
In this respect, China wants to be a co-architect of some sort with the 
U.S. in revising the existing system of rules, although it is very likely 
to begin as a junior partner in this endeavour. Other major powers in 
the Group of Eight industrialised countries will inevitably be involved 
in this global restructuring. Whether or not the U.S. will allow such a 
revision of the global-governance architecture to take place or to what 
extent the U.S. will allow China to have a greater say in world affairs 
remain to be seen. The interaction between the U.S. and China in global 
governance is likely to determine to a reasonably large extent the shape 
of the world to come, so that we might see this complex development 
as global governance with some Chinese characteristics!
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NOTES
1  For example, in per capita GDP, in per capita use of resources such as oil, minerals, 
and water, and even in per capita emission of greenhouse gases.
2  The idea of this paragraph owes a lot to Pak K. Lee of the University of Kent, UK.
3  A recently published book reinforces the important role played by states in global 
regulations, despite the rise of non-state actors in an era of globalisation and inter-
dependence (see Drezner 2007).
4  For a wide array of world problems that the humankind faces, see Yearbook of Inter-
national Organizations, 2006 volume 4.
5  According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China led the 
world in carbon dioxide emissions in 2006 by producing 6.2 billion tonnes of the 
gas. The U.S. churned out 5.8 billion tonnes. The rise was due to China's dependence 
on coal as its major energy source as well as its rising production of cement (Vidal 
and Adam 2007).
6  China has accumulated the world's largest national foreign exchange reserve, over 
US$1 trillion as of 2007. It is looking outwards to invest its sovereign wealth fund. 
For an analysis of a shift in global ﬁnancial change in this respect, see The Times 
2007: 56-7.
7  For an up-to-date and extensive study of China and international organisations, see 
Kent 2007.
8  As of 2005 China was a member of 203 intergovernmental organisations and 4,416 
international non-governmental organisations. These ﬁgures include ﬁve types of 
international organisations: federation of international organisations; universal 
membership organisations; intercontinental membership organisations; regionally 
oriented membership organisations; and organisations of special form. See Yearbook 
of International Organizations, 2006: 56 (Volume 5).
9  As of 2006 China has acceded to 302 multilateral treaties, the majority of which have 
been signed after 1979, amounting to 88 percent of all treaties that China has signed 
after its establishment in 1949 (see China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and 
Chan 2006: 70-75).
10  Despite the increasing academic attention paid to global governance, Pang Zhongying 
laments the lack of signiﬁcant contributions to the theoretical and empirical studies 
of global governance from Chinese scholars (see Pang 2006: 60-2).
11  This might explain in part why the West favours the concept of 'responsibility to 
protect', a concept that suggests that the international community should intervene 
should governments fail to protect its own citizens from widespread abuse of human 
rights, while China (and others) is ﬁercely against it.
12  China's multilateral diplomacy has recently been analysed by Wu and Lansdowne 
(eds) 2008.
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13  The amount of oil that China gets from Sudan is relatively small compared with 
what it gets from other countries in Africa and the Middle East, so that the argument 
that China is in Darfur purely for the sake of oil does not stand to scrutiny because 
of the heavy damage done to its international reputation.
14  China of course has softened it stance by appointing a special envoy to deal with the 
situation in Darfur and in agreeing to the deployment of a combined UN/African 
peacekeeping force. In November 2007 a vanguard of 135 Chinese engineers arrived 
in Darfur to start peacekeeping duties (see Xinhua News 2007). In early 2008 the 
number of Chinese engineers is Darfur had increased to around 300.
15  For an elaboration of the concept of 'responsibility to protect', check the website of 
the International Crisis Group.
16  For a detailed analysis over several case studies, see Chan 2006 and Kent 2007.
17  Sheng Lijun, expressing his views on China's soft powers, in an international confer-
ence on China, organized by the China Institute of the University of Nottingham, 
in September 2006.
18  For a sustained analysis of China's pragmatism in its foreign policy, see Zhao (ed) 
2004.
19  Alastair Iain Johnston has done a substantial amount of work in addressing this 
question, see his latest book (2008).
20  To go beyond this simple dialectic situation to explore theoretically four possible op-
tions for a country, including China, to respond to international regulatory regimes, 
see Drezner 2007.  To paraphrase, these four options are: to harmonise oneself with 
international norms; to form a rival group to oppose those norms; to join the exist-
ing club of powerful states that design and reinforce those norms; or to strategically 
adapt to or sham those standards (see especially Drezner 2007: 71-88).
21  There are exceptions, however. For example, the US takes a somewhat different path 
from some of its major European allies in dealing with China's policy towards Tibet. 
Instead of announcing a boycott of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic 
Games in August 2008, it prefers to engage with China and to apply subtle pressure 
on China to change it rather than to confront it directly.
22  The term 'congagement' was coined by Khalilzad et al. 1999: 72. 
23  For a recent book-length discussion on China's soft power, see Kurlantzick 2007. See 
also Gill and Huang 2006; Wang 2008.
24  For a development of this idea, see Chan, Lee and Chan 2008.
25  The term 'responsible stakeholder' was reportedly ﬁrst coined by Robert Zoellick 
in September 2005 when he was the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. Since mid-2007 
he has joined the World Bank as its president. See Zoellick's article at state.gov site 
(accessed 3 January 2008).
26  The same concept of stakeholder had been repeatedly used by Robert Zoellick, in his 
capacity as President of the World Bank, when he successfully invited in December 
2007 China's Import-Export Bank to contribute ﬁnancial help to the World Bank's 
International Development Association to help Africa (see Wheatley 2007).
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